Abstract. The complexity o f i n terpolation attacks on block ciphers depends on the degree of the polynomial approximation and or on the number of terms in the polynomial approximation expression. In some situations, the round function or the S-boxes of the block cipher are expressed explicitly in terms of algebraic function, yet in many other occasions the S-boxes are expressed in terms of their Boolean function representation. In this case, the cryptanalyst has to evaluate the algebraic description of the S-boxes or the round function using the Lagrange interpolation formula. A natural question is what is the e ect of the choice of the irreducible polynomial used to construct the nite eld on the degree of the resulting polynomial. Another question is whether or not there exists a simple linear transformation on the input or output bits of the S-boxes or the round function such that the resulting polynomial has a less degree or smaller number of non-zero coe cients. In this paper we give an answer to these questions. We also present an explicit relation between the Lagrange interpolation formula and the Galois Field Fourier Transform.
a eld. Given 2n elements x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; y 1 ; : : : ; y n 2 R; where the x i s are distinct. Then f x is the only polynomial over R of degree at most n , 1 such that f x i = y i for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . The main result in 3 is that for an iterated block cipher with block size m, if the cipher-text is expressed as a polynomial with n 2 m coe cients of the plain-text, then there exists an interpolation attack of time complexity n requiring n known plain-texts encrypted with a secret key K, which nds an algorithm equivalent to encryption or decryption with K. This attack can also be extended to a key recovery attack.
In 4 Jakobsen extended this cryptanalysis method to attack block ciphers with probabilistic nonlinear relation of low degree. Using recent results from coding theory Sudan's algorithm for decoding Reed-Solomon codes beyond the error correction parameter 6 , Jakobsen showed how to break ciphers where the cipher-text is expressible as evaluations of unknown univariate polynomial of low degree m with a typically low probability . The known plain-text attack requires n = 2 m= 2 plain-text cipher-text pairs. In the same paper, Jakobsen also presented a second attack that needs access to n = 2 m= 2 plain-text cipher-text pairs and its running time is polynomial in n.
It is clear that the complexity of such cryptanalytic attacks depends on the degree of the polynomial approximation or on the number of terms in the polynomial approximation expression. In some situations, the round function or the S-boxes of the block cipher are expressed explicitly in terms of algebraic function For example see 8 , y et in many other occasions the S-boxes are expressed in terms of their Boolean function representation. In this case, the cryptanalyst has to evaluate the algebraic description of the S-boxes or the round function using the Lagrange interpolation formula. A natural question is what is the e ect of the choice of the irreducible polynomial used to construct the nite eld on the degree of the resulting polynomial. Another question is whether or not there exists a simple linear transformation on the input or output bits of the S-boxes or the round function such that the resulting polynomial has a less degree or smaller number of coe cients. In this paper we give explicit answer to these questions. To illustrate the idea, consider the binary mapping from GF 2 4 to GF 2 4 given in the Table 1 . If the Lagrange interpolation formula is applied to GF 2 4 where GF 2 4 is de ned by the irreducible polynomial X 4 +X 3 +1 then we h a ve F X = X +X 2 +7 X 3 +1 5 X 4 +5 X 5 +1 4 X 6 +1 4 X 8 +2 X 9 +7 X 10 +9 X 12 ; X2 GF 2 4 . However, if we use the irreducible polynomial X 4 + X + 1 to de ne GF 2 4 then we h a ve F X = X 3 ; X2 GF 2 4 which i s o b viously a simpler description.
An interesting observation follows when applying the Lagrange interpolation formula to the DES S-boxes. In this case we consider the DES S-boxes output Table 1. coordinates as a mapping from GF 2 6 t o GF 2 . Let f be the Boolean function resulting from XORing all the output coordinates of the DES S-box n umber four. When we de ne GF 2 6 using the irreducible polynomial X 6 + X 5 + 1 , the polynomial resulting from applying the Lagrange interpolation formula to f has only 39 nonzero coe cient. The Hamming weight of all the exponents corresponding to the nonzero coe cients was 3. It should be noted that the expected value of the number of nonzero coe cients for a randomly selected function over GF 2 6 is 63. While this observation doesn't have a cryptanalytic signi cance, it shows the e ect of changing the irreducible polynomial when trying to search for a polynomial representation for cipher functions.
Mathematical background and de nitions
For a background about the general theory of nite elds, the reader is referred to 1 and for a background about nite elds of charachteristic 2, the reader is referred to 2 .
Most of the results in this paper can be extended in a straightforward way from GF 2 n t o GF q n . Throughout this paper, we use integer labels to present nite eld elements. I.e., for any element X 2 GF 2 4 , X = P n,1 i=0 x i+1 i ; x i 2 GF 2 where is a root of the irreducible polynomial which de nes GF 2 n , we represent X by P n,1 i=0 x i+1 2 i as an integer in the range 0; 2 n ,1 . The associated addition and multiplication operations of these labels are de ned by the nite eld structure and have no resemblance to modular integer arithmetic. In the literature, and ,1 are swapped in the equations above. Since and ,1 have the same order, we m a y use the form presented here. We use this form in order to make it easy to compare with the polynomial representation. For the purpose of our discussion, we will consider the case with q = 2 n , m = 1 and l = 2 n , 1. For a detailed discussion of the general case relation between the Lagrange Interpolation formula and the GFFT, the reader is referred to 13 . Theorem6. Let 
Relation between Boolean functions and its Galois led polynomial representation
Let F 2 = GF 2 and F n 2 = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n jx i 2 F 2 g. Let f x 1 ; : : : ; x n be a function from F n 2 to F n 2 . Then f x 1 ; : : : ; x n can be written as f x 1 ; : : : ; x n = y 1 ; : : : ; y n , where y j is a Boolean function in n variables, i.e., y j = y j x 1 ; : : : ; x n . Since F n 2 is isomorphic to GF 2 n , then f x 1 ; : : : ; x n can be regarded as a function F from GF 2 n t o GF 2 n .
It is well known that applying a linear transformation to a function f doesn't change its nonlinear degree. It is also known that the nonlinear degree of the function f X = X d is wt d . The following theorem illustrates the e ect of applying a linear transformation to the output coordinates of f on the coe cients of its corresponding polynomial. is constructed using the irreducible polynomial The following theorem illustrates the e ect of changing the irreducible polynomial used to construct the nite eld on the coe cients resulting polynomial.
Theorem9. Let F X be a function of GF 2 n which corresponds to the Boolean mapping f x 1 ; : : : ; x n = f 1 x ; : : : ; f n x over F n 2 using irreducible R 1 . Then the function G x which corresponds to the boolean mapping f x 1 ; : : : ; x n and constructed using a di erent irreducible polynomial R 2 6 = R 1 can be expressed a s
where L is an invertible linear transformation over GF 2 n .
On the Interpolation Attacks on Block Ciphers
Proof: Consider the nite eld generated by an irreducible polynomial R 1 X . In this case, GF Example 2. Consider the Boolean function described in Table 3 . Using the irreducible polynomial X To summarize the results in this section, a linear transformation on the output coordinates a ects only the coe cients of the exponents that belong to the same cyclotomic cosets of the exponent in the original function representation. A linear transformation on the input coordinates or changing the irreducible polynomial a ect only the coe cients of the exponents with Hamming weight less than or equal to the maximum Hamming weight of the exponents in original function representation.
Checking algebraic expressions for trap doors
In 5 the authors presented a method to construct trap door block ciphers which contains some hidden structures known only to the cipher designers. The sample trapdoor cipher in 5 w as broken 12 and designing practical trape door S-boxes is still an intersting topic. In this section we discuss how t o c heck if the S-boxes or the round function has a simple algebraic structure. In particular, we consider the case where we can represent the round function or the S-boxes by a monomial. The numb e r o f i n vertible linear transformations grows exponentially with n. Using exhaustive search t o c heck if applying an invertible linear transformation to the output and or the input coordinates of the Boolean function f x 1 ; : : : ; x n = f 1 x ; : : : ; f n x leads to a simpler polynomial representation becomes computationally infeasible even for small values of n. In this section we show h o w t o c heck for the existence of such simple description. Note that we only consider the case of polynomials o ver GF 2 n . S-boxes with a complex algebraic expression over GF 2 n m a y h a ve a simpler description over other elds. If one tries to evaluate the above expression and equate the coe cients to the coe cients of a monomial, then one has to solve a set of non linear equations with unknowns a j ; j = 0 ; 1; : : : ; n , 1.
To o vercome this problem, we will reduce the problem of undoing the e ect of a linear transformation on the input coordinates to undoing the e ect of a linear transformation on the output coordinates.
Consider G X obtained by a linear transformation on the input coordinates of F X . Then G X = F L X . Thus we h a ve G ,1 X = L ,1 F ,1 X . If F X is a monomial,then F ,1 X is also a monomialand our problem is reduced to nding the linear transformation L ,1 on the output coordinates of F ,1 X which is equivalent to solving a system of linear equations in n variables. Example 4. Consider the function G X = 8 X 2 + 9 X 3 + X 4 + 1 1 X 5 + 1 4 X 6 + X 7 + 1 2 X 8 + 2 X 9 + 9 X 10 + 4 X 11 + 1 1 X 12 + 1 4 X 13 + 1 4 X 14 2 GF 2 4 where GF 2 4 is constructed using the irreducible polynomial X 4 + X 3 + 1. In this case, we h a ve G X ,1 = 5 X 7 + 5 X 11 + 1 1 X 13 + 1 5 X 14 . In this case, we h a ve 60 linear transformations on the output coordinates of G ,1 X that will map it to a monomial of exponent with weight 3. Out of these 60 transformations, we h a ve 15 linear transformations such that L G ,1 X = aX 13 ; a2 GF 2 4 . In particular, the linear mapping L X = X + 1 4 X 2 + 9 X 4 + 1 4 X 8 on the output bits of G ,1 X reduces G ,1 X t o X 13 , i.e., L G ,1 X = X 13 and hence G X = L X 7 .
Undoing the e ect of changing the irreducible polynomial corresponds to undoing the e ect of a linear transformation on both the input and the output coordinates which seems to be a hard problem. The number of irreducible polynomials of degree n over a nite eld with q elements is given by Since the dominant term in I n occurs for d = 1 , w e get the estimate I n q n n 38
Thus for typical S-box sizes, exhaustive search through all the set of 2 n =n irreducible polynomials seems to be a feasible task.
